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“Existing International Instruments and Mechanisms” 
Anna Leander  
(Hansewissenschaftskolleg Delmenhorst and Copenhagen Business school) 
 
As the scale and scope private military and security companies (PMSCs) are rapidly 
expanding internationally, the question of their regulation is evermore pressing. Although 
credible exact figures on the activities of the companies are not available,1 there is ample 
indication that the companies play a central role around the world. In Iraq, a Department 
of Defense survey estimates that there are some 180.000 contractors compared to 160.000 
U.S. troops (Singer, 2007: 2). In Nigeria some 1000 registered security companies 
constitute the second economic sector in the economy after oil (Abrahamsen and 
Williams, 2006a). Moreover, the scope of PMSC activity is steadily expanding. The trend 
to privatize and outsource a growing range of activities places PMSCs in charge of an 
ever growing range of formerly military or policing tasks. The predictable consequence is 
that PMSCs are increasingly visible and controversial. Incidences such as that in the 
Nisour square Baghdad where Blackwater contractors were involved in an incident 
leaving 17 dead civilians on 16th of September 2007 focus attention around the regulatory 
context of PMSC work. This presentation discusses one aspect of that regulatory context, 
namely the existing international regulation.  
Contradictory statements about the state of international regulation of the PMSCs 
abound. On the one hand it is often suggested that there is a lack of regulation and that 
PMSCs operate in a legal vacuum. Confronting these assertions are statements 
underlining that PMSCs are covered by international law, that they do not operate in a 
legal void and that if anything the problem is the multiple contradictory legal norms and 
standards. This presentation suggests that both understanding are partly valid. A 
multiplicity of indirect international legal instruments coexists with a scarcity of specific 
ones. To make this point the presentation departs from the complexity and diversity of 
PMSC activity as an object of regulation (1). This clarifies the multiplicity of potentially 
relevant indirect international instruments of regulation (2). It also helps understand the 
scarcity of international instruments specifically designed to regulate PMSCs (3). The 
presentation then proceeds to suggests that this constellation has limited the significance 
of international instruments as tools for regulating PMSCs (4). The presentation 
concludes by pointing to three coexisting, mutually exclusive understandings, of the 
proper role and potential of the UN 1989 Convention in this context (5).  
1 The PMSC as an Object of Regulation 
When regulation is discussed it is important to clarify what it is one wants to regulate, 
why, how and at what kind of costs. A look at what PMSCs do in what contexts makes 
clear that no self-evident simple answer can be given to these questions.  
                                                 
1 I endorse the suggestion that “current information about the private Security Industry is largely piecemeal 
and unsubstantiated”, something the industry survey (based on 14 companies) does not do address (IPOA, 
2007). 
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PMSCs have in common that they are private firms selling military and security 
services. However this covers a wide range of things. PMSCs are firms involved in the 
provision of  
? Logistics: such as cooking, construction work, medical services, but also the 
provision and maintenance of equipment including armament systems, in-air 
refueling of military aircraft or the operation of UAVs (unmanned armed vehicles). 
? Consultancy: advising on security needs, often involving suggestions for how to 
answer those needs, including in situations of armed conflict. 
? Training: of armed forces, police units but also of private security staff, sometimes in 
the context of ongoing conflict. 
? Intelligence: the provision and analysis of intelligence and intelligence related 
services (e.g. translation, interrogation). Sometimes suggestions about how 
intelligence should be acted upon. 
? Direct security services: such as for example the guarding of convoys, of military 
compounds, of refugee camps but also in provision of personnel for specific security 
or military operations. 
 
More than this, it is useful to recall that PMSCs work in diverse contexts and for a 
variety of clients. PMSCs work spans the full range of contexts. In particular it is worth 
recalling that PMSCs operate: 
? In political situations: ranging from declared war to internal wars, and “post-
conflict” as well as in situations to situations of “peace”. 
? In geographical locations: spanning stable developed OECD states (e.g. Germany) 
as well as highly unstable states with sever and lasting security problems (e.g. Ituri, 
DRC).  
? For clients: including armed forces, states, political movements, private firms, 
NGOs, criminal organizations and private individuals.  
? With a legality of contracts: going from the fully illegal contract (e.g. an organized 
crime organization hiring a security specialist to bomb a rival), to contracts that are 
partially legal (e.g. states using PMSCs to do their “dirty work”), and contracts that 
are fully legal (e.g. a registered contract between an extractive firm and a contractor 
guarding its installations). 
 
Finally (and obviously by now), the firms referred to as PMSCs are a diverse lot: 
? Of varying size and stability: Some firms are large multinational corporations, 
quoted on stock-markets with long corporate histories while others are informal one 
man creations that come and go.  
? Of varying origin: PMSCs are often talked and written about as if they were only or 
mainly a UK and US phenomenon. It may be worth recalling that this is not the case. 
Other OECD countries also have significant private security sectors and so do non 
OECD countries. These companies are not restricted to covering their national home-
market but also work internationally. KK (a Kenyan company) for example is present 
widely East Africa and companies across Latin America, Africa and Asia have 
subcontracted staff to firms in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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? With varying ties to their home states and their public security forces: some 
firms are closely tied to their home states and their armed forces while others operate 
largely independently of these. 
? With varying company cultures/policies and strategies: firm policies on vetting of 
staff, labor relations, choice of clients, and acceptable working environments/tasks 
correspondingly could not be more diverse. 
 
2 The Multiple Indirect Instruments 
Because PMSCs are diverse, complex and multiple, they raise correspondingly multiple 
and complex legal and regulatory questions. Dressing a complete list of these questions 
and the legal instruments that might be used to address them is beyond the ambition here. 
The purpose below is to give an indication of the multiplicity of international legal 
instruments potentially relevant for the regulation of this activity. Because these 
instruments are not primarily designed for regulating PMSC activity, but rather are 
general instruments designed to regulate violations of a specific kind of human right, or 
more generally ensure its enjoyment, the instruments of regulation are termed indirect 
(Table 1 gives an overview). Just briefly in terms of each of these categories and their 
pertinence for regulating PMSC activity: 
The international regulation of war and peace: Some PMSC activity falls directly 
under the international regulation of war. Because PMSCs may be used to prepare or 
engage war, their activities may be subjected to restrictions as part of attempts to regulate 
just reasons for going to war, jus ad bello. Hence, neutrality laws – as specified e.g. by 
the 1907 Hague Convention V (article 4) – strictly limit the role that might be played by 
individuals and companies of purportedly neutral states. Similarly, because PMSCs may 
work in war situations they are subjected to the rules regulating behavior in war, the jus 
in bellum. The ICRC has insisted and repeated that when PMSCs engage as combatants 
they are bound by the Geneva conventions and states are responsible for ensuring that 
these are followed. Finally, contractors are also significantly held by IHL in post conflict 
situations (jus post bellum) (UCHL, 2005, UN, 2005). 
 Rules Concerning Mercenarism: Slightly more specific, part of PMSC activity 
falls under the international regulation of mercenarism. It does so to the extent that 
PMSCs engage in mercenarism (act as soldiers of fortune) as defined by international 
law.2 The OAU Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa and the UN 
Convention against the finance and use of mercenaries both demand that signatories 
refrain from using mercenaries and take measures to prevent mercenaries from operating 
from their territories. 
                                                 
2  The basic definition of a mercenary, adopted with variation in the two conventions, is spelled out in 
article 47 of the protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 which defines defines a 
mercenary as a person who combines the characteristics of being 1) is specifically recruited locally or 
abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict, 2) does take direct part in hostilities; 3) is motivated 
essentially by private gain; 4) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict; 5) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 6) 
has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed 
forces. 
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Specialized Conventions: Even more specifically, the wide variety of PMSC 
activity may make a wide range of international treaties relevant for their behavior. The 
list in table 1 is only a selection of treaties and conventions that have recently been 
invoked in relation to PMSC activities. The list could be extended.  
 Arms trade regulations and embargoes: In addition to this, regional and 
international regulations of arms trade and military assistance may have a bearing of 
PMSC activities. Firms providing logistics (including arms), training (also soldiers), 
consultancy (also on military matters) or providing direct security services (which are 
separated only by a thin and often blurred line from military services) are trading arms 
and providing military assistance. Hence both more permanent rules (such as the UN 
Small Arms Trade Treaty; EU and ECOWAS regulations) and specific regulations 
concerning a specific country or a specific conflict (embargoes of different kinds) directly 
regulate PMSC activity. 
 National rules with international application: Moreover, some regulation which is 
national in origin is adhered to internationally by firms that are not operating in the 
jurisdiction where the regulation is directly applicable. This is the case for example of the 
US foreign corrupt practices act or the UK anti terrorism legislation. 
 Informal rules, including general voluntary standards codes of conduct: Last but 
not least a long list of informal rules with a bearing on the regulation of PMSC activities 
could be dressed. Many voluntary codes of conduct directly concern the activities of 
PMSCs. This is true of codes of conduct that cover different aspects of firm relations with 
the society in which they operate, with the government in the countries where they work 
(e.g. Transparency International Business Principles for Countering Bribery ), as well as 
general codes of conduct regulating business behavior in relation to specific issues (e.g. 
the maintenance of security3) or in specific sectors (e.g. the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative www.eitransparency.org ) or any thinkable combination of these 
(e.g. UN Global Compact Principles). 
This protracted (and yet incomplete) list of indirect international regulatory 
instruments underlies the view of those who argue that PMSCs are well covered by 
international law(e.g. de Wolf, 2007, Doswald-Beck, 2007, UCHL, 2005, Zarate, 1998).  
 
3 The Scarce Specific Instruments 
The abundance of international legal instruments indirectly relevant for the regulation of 
PMSC activity is matched by the paucity of instruments designed specifically to regulate 
PMSCs. This paucity has the same roots as the abundance of indirect instruments of 
regulation. The complexity, multiplicity and variety of PMSC activity have limited the 
development of specific international instruments for regulating PMSC activity (see 
TABLE 1). 
 There is at present no international treaty or convention that regulates the 
activities of PMSCs specifically. It is sometimes suggested that situation specific 
regulation constitutes a form of international regulation. For example, in Iraq the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (order 17 of June 24 2004) defined the legal status 
                                                 
3 The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights for firms in extractive and energy sectors, are a 
good example (www.voluntaryprinciples.org ). 
 6
of contractors working for the authority.4 However, the CPA is not an international 
authority and the instrument not an international legal instrument. The only formal form 
of regulation of PMSC activity internationally is the regulation specified in the contracts 
tied to specific operations. Contracts usually define the scope and scale of activities the 
PMSC concerned may engage in. They also define the “rules of engagement” regulating 
the PMSC use of force in conflict situation. That is contractual regulation is at present the 
formal regulation of most immediate relevance for the regulation of PMSC activity. 
 In addition to this, informal international regulation of PMSC activity exists in the 
form of limited and voluntary codes of conduct and standards of behavior developed 
specifically for PMSCs. Examples of such codes of conduct include the codes of conduct 
promoted by the professional associations of companies in the sector such as the 
International Peace Operations Association Code of Conduct or the British Association of 
Private Security Companies Charter or the Codes of Conduct. 
 PMSC activities are not consistently regulated by any body of international law. 
This makes it justified to suggest, as many observers do, that PMSCs operate in a legal 
vacuum (Coleman, 2004, Dorn and Levi, 2007a, Minow, 2003, Scoville, 2006). 
 
4 International Instruments Regulating PMSCs 
This constellation of scarce specific instruments and abundant indirect ones has been of 
limited practical utility for regulating PMSC activities. The technical difficulties of using 
the hypothetically relevant instruments have been compounded by a political 
unwillingness to do so. This point will be made in general terms and elaborated 
specifically with reference to the difficulty of using international regulatory mechanisms 
of mercenary activity. 
 The diversity and complexity of PMSC activity often makes it technically 
difficult to regulate with the help of formal legal instruments such as those listed above. 
The reason is that much of this activity falls outside the categories on which these legal 
instruments are based. Basic distinctions between public and private, civilian and 
combatant, peace and war or between national and international are difficult to apply in 
straightforward fashion. For example: PMSCs often operate as private actors but at the 
service of states making the boundary between the public and the private (corporate 
and/or individual) highly uncertain (Dorn and Levi, 2007b). Similarly, the proximity and 
presence of PMSCs as private agents “on the battle field” blurs the distinction between 
civilian and combatant (Heaton, 2005, Zamparelli, 1999). Finally, the lack of a clear line 
between “military” and “security” aspects of PMSC activity makes the categories war 
and peace difficult to meaningfully employ (Olonisakin, 2000). The difficulties of easily 
placing PMSC activities in legal categories render regulation correspondingly uncertain. 
It makes questions of applicability and suitability of indirect instruments central. PMSC 
activities consequently have tendency to fall between potential regulatory mechanisms 
even when attempts are made to stretch and bend categories and interpret them as widely 
as possible, in order to capture PMSC activity. This is all the more significant as the use 
and enforcement of the formal international regulation just cited depends on the due 
diligence of states that is on their willingness to enforce international regulations (UCHL, 
                                                 
4 In a way often interpreted as granting them immunity from legal pursuit by Iraqi authorities. 
 7
2005). Uncertainty and disagreement about categories is an easy technical/formal excuse 
for not doing this which is often combined with an outright and publicly stated lack of 
political willingness. 
Indeed, the political enthusiasm for relying on international instruments to 
regulate PMSC activity is limited. This is partly because any such regulation runs into the 
perennial difficulty of all attempts to control and regulate security at the international 
level. Most states prefer to have strict control over their own security and are unwilling to 
delegate control over the use of force to the international level and/or to share 
information of their own activities. Since some PMSCs activity is specifically intended to 
circumvent national and international rules this argument has substantial relevance both 
in the context of developing and developed countries (Musah, 2002, Walker and Whyte, 
2005). More than this, the unwillingness to rely on international instruments to regulate 
PMSC activity is reflective of the overall hesitation to regulate markets. Indeed, market 
construction, outsourcing and privatizing have been declared policy aims in across very 
different contexts. The attachment to this policy has traits of a “new religion” (Minow, 
2003) with missionary overtones as it has been pushed onto those hesitant in adopting it.5 
“Massive failings” on most accounts including the economic, humanitarian and military 
have been disregarded and/or explained away (Markusen, 2003, Rasor and Bauman, 
2007, Reno, 2004). Many states have not been willing to interfere with markets (national 
or international). This has severely hampered the innovative use of existing international 
regulatory instruments not to speak about the development of new instruments 
specifically designed to regulate PMSC activity.  
These general arguments are well illustrated by the limited role of the 1989 UN 
convention in regulating PMSC mercenarism. Technical difficulties hamper the use of the 
convention for this purpose. The Convention’s definition of “mercenary” is for example 
often argued to be difficult to work with for the regulation of PMSCs. The reasons 
provided are numerous and contradictory. They include that the definition used in the 
convention: 
? covers persons not corporations and hence misses most relevant PMSC activity;  
? does not properly allow for a distinction between legal and legitimate PMSC activity 
and illegitimate ones;  
? emphasizes the individual gain motivation which is both difficult to prove legally and 
irrelevant;  
? is based on the nationality of a person; a criteria that might be both misleading (as it 
can change rapidly) and irrelevant;  
? is restricted to situations of armed conflict and/or of armed activity aimed to 
undermine states, hence excludes most relevant situations including those where  
soldier for hire are used (i) in “peace” situations (ii) by states against their own 
citizens and (iii) by individuals or firms for reasons other than de-stabilizing a state.  
In addition to these concerns with the definition of mercenarism, the Convention has also 
been criticized for other technical reasons, including for its purported lack of clarity about 
                                                 
5 Military assistance and SSR support is increasingly channeled through private firms and the market. The 
model that is promoted in this way is clearly one where the market has a place. For example, “the SSR 
process in Sierra Leone has concentrated n constructing a Western-Style security structure: an externally-
focused army, an unarmed constabulary, and a small, tightly controlled armed police component” 
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006b: 16).  
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the criminalization and extradition procedures, its lack of enforcement mechanisms and 
its lack of clear monitoring procedures.  
However, the weak political interest in and support for the 1989 UN convention is 
no doubt the key reason for its limited role in regulating PMSCs. States have not been 
interested in using it innovatively to regulate PMSCs and/or in reforming it to make it 
more suitable for that purpose. This is linked to the technical difficulties just indicated. It 
is also linked to the timing and tone of the Convention. The convention was conceived in 
response to concerns that arose during the de-colonization struggle and hence appears 
slightly anachronistic to some observers (Milliard, 2003). 6 The most significant reason 
however, is that many states have simply not been interested in regulating the sector, at 
least not at the international level through the UN convention. Regulation has been seen 
as potentially hampering efficiency, imposing red tape and potentially undermining the 
competitiveness of firms in the industry.  
The weakness of the political backing is visible in the history of the convention. 
The convention was adopted in 1989 by the general assembly, but it took 12 years for it 
to enter into force which it did in 2001 when Costa Rica became the twenty second state 
party. Today 30 states have ratified the convention. However, none of the UN permanent 
Security Council members have nor have key states for PMSC activity such as South 
Africa, Israel, Columbia, Sweden, Denmark or El Salvador. The states parties to the 
convention also do not seem to find it an important and/or useful instrument for 
regulating PMSCs. Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, Nigeria, and Ukraine are all 
signatories that have permitted or benefited from mercenary trade (Frye, 2005: 2642). 
Tellingly, the working group on the use of mercenaries tried to obtain information from 
UN member states regarding their views on issues relevant to the convention. 23 replied, 
some only to express the view that “mercenarism” did not exist in, or affect, their 
countries (UN, 2007: 5 and 9). In so many words, most states found the Convention by 
and large irrelevant and were not even willing to spare the time necessary to answer a 
request for information about their view on it. 
The example of the 1989 UN Convention has illustrated the general point that the 
existence of international regulatory instruments directly relevant for the activities of 
PMSCs, or part thereof (as most instruments are “indirect”) has not necessarily helped 
ensure effective international regulation. The complexity involved in regulating PMSC 
activities that often defy the basic of assumptions of the regulatory instruments available 
is part of the explanation for this. But the lack of interest in using, transforming and 
developing regulatory instruments is at least as important. The consequence of this is that 
formal international regulation of PMSC plays a rather limited role. Informal 
international regulation (voluntary codes and standards) fares slightly better. It is, by 
definition adopted, and sometimes developed, by the PMSCs themselves with the explicit 
intention of legitimizing activities. As such it is integrated into PMSC codes of conduct, 
less susceptible to be rejected on technical grounds and hence something (the concerned) 
PMSCs can be required and expected to follow. There are obvious limitations to informal 
                                                 
6 “…sovereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity, and self-determination of peoples” are 
the key concerns in the convention. These concerns are not outdated. However, by the time the convention 
passed the emergence of PMSCs, the end of formal colonial aspirations and the emphasis on good 
governance and capacity building had radically transformed the concrete expression of these concerns 
(Clapham, 1996, Duffield, 2001). 
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regulation in terms of scope, content, monitoring, enforcement, and actual regulatory 
impact on PMSC behavior in general. However, at present it is the most significant type 
of international instruments for regulating PMSC behavior. 
 
5 The 1989 Convention as a Regulatory Instrument in 
the Current Context 
This account of the role of international regulatory instruments raises the general question 
of what scope there is for formal international regulation of PMSC activity in general. To 
conclude this presentation I want to suggest that three general answers coexist and 
compete with each other (the positions are summarized in Table 2). I will draw on the 
discussions surrounding the 1989 Convention to introduce them: 
The Conservative View: The conservative view is that the relevance of the 1989 
Convention is best ensured by working with the convention as it stands, without 
expanding its role either through legal practice or through reformulations and 
redefinitions. The rationale for this position is that even if the convention has many 
limitations, it is an international legal instrument that has entered into force, an 
achievement unlikely to be repeated. As such it is potentially useful, albeit in a limited 
way. This position is likely to perpetuate both the idea that the Convention is of marginal 
contemporary relevance and the related difficulties of finding political backing for the 
Convention and actions based on it. 
The Market Accommodating View: holds that the only way to ensure the 1989 
Convention’s pertinence as an international regulatory instrument is to ensure that it 
acknowledges and makes room for legitimate market activities (and hence PMSCs). The 
“post-colonial myopia” has to be overcome (Milliard, 2003). From this perspective the 
convention could be useful for separating legitimate PMSCs from illegitimate ones 
paving the way for regulated markets. Practical suggestions to this end include 
redefinitions of mercenarism that would exclude legitimate PMSC activity,7 the 
development of codes of conduct that PMSCs could follow and corresponding black-
listings of erring ones. Generally, measures should be developed in dialogue with PMSCs 
and their interest groups to ensure the effectiveness of the measures. The consequence of 
this view is that PMSC activities are legitimized (at least in part) and can hence more 
readily be extended. As for the Convention, while its visible relevance would be 
increased, its substantive role would be less clear and its role as a regulatory instrument 
correspondingly weakened. 
The De-Commodifying View: Quite contrary to the market accommodating view, 
the de-commodifying one considers markets for military and security services as largely 
illegitimate, dangerous and reflecting a minority political position. “The rise of the 
corporate mercenary has effectively resulted in a divergence between the letter and the 
spirit of international law.” (Coleman, 2004: 1506) The main ambition of regulation 
should be to establish the consistency.8 The 1989 Convention could be used in this spirit 
                                                 
7 Former special rapporteur Ballesteros suggested on such redefinition in (UN, 1997). 
8 Coleman further argues that the “employment of the modern mercenary can be understood as merely one 
facet of a larger philosophical problem posed by the United States' apparent combination of both the power 
and the will to ignore international law in multifold circumstances” (Coleman, 2004: 1449). 
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to underscore the illegitimacy of markets and to de-commodify (taking out of the market) 
the use of force. This translates in the promotion of measures that would expand the 
understanding of mercenarism so that it could be used to condemn the market activities of 
PMSCs. In addition to this measures that reestablish state control over the market for 
example by introducing licensing and registration systems ensuring that PMSCs and their 
staff are under state (or international) control, by creating mechanisms by which states 
(both host and home) register/approve contracts, and/or by strictly limiting the activities 
in which PMSCs may lawfully engage. This position delegitimates PMSC activity 
generally. Its effect on the Convention is uncertain. It may increase the interest of states 
(and others) resisting the watering down of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force in the Convention as a regulatory instrument. 
 
These three contradictory views underscore that international regulatory 
instruments can be used for widely diverging purposes, in very different ways and with 
diametrically opposed consequences for PMSCs and their activities. The obvious 
implication is that basic question – what is the aim of regulation? – is of essence. The 
answer is pivotal for thinking about by which existing international regulatory 
mechanisms can be used, should be transformed or perhaps even invented. It is also 
essential for thinking about the process through which this can best be done. This point is 
at the heart of this presentation. As the presentation has shown there certainly is no 
shortage of (indirect) international legal instruments that may be useful to regulate part of 
PMSC activity. The question is if there is an interest in using them. Similarly, even there 
is no abundance of direct legal instruments; the central issue is if it there is an interest in 
such regulation and in that case what exactly its aim should be. The current lack of 
enthusiasm about using international regulatory instruments to control PMSC activity – 
and the related limited practical impact of these – would seem to indicate that there is not. 
Reflection about the implications for human rights, public security, peace and regime 
stability may change this. The regulatory context of the next Nisour incident may well be 
different from this one.  
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7 Tables 
TABLE 1: International Regulatory Instruments (selected examples) 
  Specific Indirect 
Formal Situation Specific Regulation: (CPA Order 17 of 24 
June 2007) 
Contractual Regulation 
Regulation of Peace and War 
- Hague Convention V 
- International Humanitarian Law (Geneva Conventions, additional protocols) 
- International Law Commission Draft Code of Offences against Peace and 
Security of Mankind 
Regulation of Mercenarism 
- 1977 OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 
- 1989 UN Convention against the Finance and Use of Mercenaries 
Specialized Treaties/Conventions 
- The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
- The UN Convention against Torture 
- The Slavery Convention 
- Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking 
- ILO Conventions  
- Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft 
- Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
- Convention in the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons 
- Convention against the Taking of Hostages 
- Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation  
- The UN Mine Action Standards 
Arms Trade Regulations: 
- ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons 
- EU Arms Export Controls, embargoes 
- UN Small Arms Trade Treaty 
Internationally applied national legislations 
- the US Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act 
- the UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
Informal IPOA code of conduct 
BAPSC charter 
Voluntary Standards (e.g. The Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights) 
Firm Policies 
Global Compact Standards  
The Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
NGO Standards and Codes of Conduct 
 
 
TABLE 2: Views on the Role of the 1989 Convention 
 Conservative   Market Accommodating De-Commodifying
General Rationale Promote the convention as is 
with the limited aim of using it 
against mercenarism classically 
understood. 
Acknowledge the legitimate 
role of markets and establish 
regulation that sort legitimate 
firms from illegitimate ones 
Reaffirm the state control over 
the legitimate use force. Take 
military security services out of 
the market 
Suggested Action Increase number of parties 
(common to all) 
Restrict mercenarism: 
distinguishing it from PMSC 
activity 
Promotion of PMSC codes of 
conduct 
Black lists and information 
exchanges on contract breaches 
Increased dialogue with PMSC 
firms and Interest groups 
Expand mercenarism: include 
corporations 
Registration and licensing 
systems for PMSCs 
State approval of contracts  
Strictly limited tasks 
Expand monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms 
Implications for PMSC activity Largely irrelevant Legitimizing 
Extension of activities 
De-legitimizing 
Restriction of activities 
Implications for Convention Irrelevance Possible increased adherence to 
Convention 
Risk that effective regulation is 
moved to national, firm and 
market level 
Possible increased adherence to 
Convention 
 
Exponents  The PMSCs/ professional 
associations 
Zarate, Milliard 
Frye, Coleman. 
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